Replication Data for: Property Rights in a Weak State: Evidence from Land Pawning in Qing Taiwan (1683-1895)

Land pawning is considered inefficient because it causes property rights to be unclearly delineated. Despite this, it once prevailed worldwide. We propose that this system flourished when state capacity was weak and the private sector spontaneously managed public affairs. Local collaboration made it difficult to sell land outright to an outsider who might be an unreliable collaborator. Land pawning granted the pawner’s family and neighbors a “probation” period to observe the pawnee’s behavior. If they found the pawnee irresponsible, they could still redeem the land. Data compiled from contracts in Qing Taiwan support our hypothesis.

土地典当（Land pawning）因产权界定模糊而被视为低效制度。尽管如此，它曾在全球范围内盛行。我们提出，当国家能力薄弱、私营部门自发管理公共事务时，这一制度得以繁荣发展。地方协作机制使得向可能不可靠的外来合作者直接出售土地变得困难。土地典当为出典人（pawner）的家人及邻里提供了一段“考察期”（probation period），以观察承典人（pawnee）的行为。若发现承典人不负责任，他们仍可赎回土地。从清代台湾契约中整理的数据支持了我们的假设。