Replication Data for: Shirking and Slacking in Parliament

How and why do the activities of members of parliament (MPs) change in response to electoral constraints? In this article, we draw on unique and newly collected data from the Swiss federal chambers and two cantonal parliaments (Basel‐Stadt and Basel‐Land) to explore the effects of electoral constraints. Leveraging variation in mandatory term limits, we study the extent to which term‐limited MPs engage in shirking—that is, move away from their principal, whether it be the party and/or voters—and slacking—that is, reduce their parliamentary activities. Our analysis, which draws on a combination of novel roll‐call votes and speech data, yields mixed results: while there is no evidence of shirking by term‐limited MPs in the cantonal parliaments, we find some indications of such behavior among term‐limited legislators in the federal chambers. These latter legislators also engage in some limited slacking, which is not observable in the cantonal parliaments. Our findings shed light on the (political) implications of term limits and the effect of electoral constraints on legislator behavior.

议员（Members of Parliament，以下简称MP）的履职行为会如何、因何因应选举约束而发生变化？本文基于瑞士联邦议会两院以及巴塞尔城市州（Basel-Stadt）、巴塞尔乡村州（Basel-Land）两个州议会独有的全新采集数据集，探讨选举约束的影响效应。借助强制性任期限制的差异情境，我们分析任期受限议员在多大程度上会出现卸责行为——即背离其委托人（政党与/或选民）——以及懈怠行为——即减少其议会履职活动。本研究结合全新的唱名表决数据与发言数据展开分析，得到了混合性研究结论：州议会中的任期受限议员未表现出卸责行为，但联邦议会的任期受限议员则存在此类行为的若干迹象。此外，这类联邦议会的任期受限议员还存在一定程度的懈怠行为，而该现象在州议会中并未被观测到。本研究结论为任期限制的（政治）影响以及选举约束对议员行为的作用机制提供了新的学术洞见。