Replication Data for: Domestic Institutions, Geographic Concentration, and Agricultural Liberalization

One of the persistent obstacles to trade liberalization is a government’s inability to commit and deliver compensation to trade losers. We argue that constitutional structures interact with the geographic profiles of industries to shape a government’s ability to commit to a compensation contract, defined as an interbranch contract whereby an executive branch promises compensation in exchange for legislative support for ratification. Our theory predicts that parliamentary systems are more likely to liberalize and compensate geographically concentrated industries because party leaders enforce a contract with a smaller number of legislators. Presidential systems are more likely to liberalize and compensate geographically diffused industries because legislature enforces a contract with a larger number of legislators. Using novel product-level data on agricultural trade liberalization and remote-sensed cropland in 38 democracies, we find evidence consistent with our argument. Qualitative studies of the sugar industry and interviews with policymakers provide further evidence.

贸易自由化进程长期存在的核心阻碍之一，便是政府无法做出有效承诺并向贸易受损方兑现补偿。我们提出，宪法架构与产业地理分布特征相互作用，将塑造政府履行补偿协议的能力——此处的补偿协议特指行政部门为换取立法机关对贸易自由化法案的批准支持，而达成的跨部门合约。我们的理论预测，议会制（parliamentary systems）更倾向于对地理集中度较高的产业推行贸易自由化并提供相应补偿，因为政党领袖仅需监管少数议员即可落实此类协议；而总统制（presidential systems）则更倾向于对地理分布较为分散的产业推行贸易自由化并提供补偿，因为立法机关需要协调更多议员的立场以达成合约。我们利用涵盖38个民主国家的农产品贸易自由化产品级数据与遥感耕地（remote-sensed cropland）数据开展实证分析，所得结果与我们的理论论点相符。针对制糖业的质性研究以及对政策制定者的访谈，进一步为上述观点提供了佐证。