Replication Data for: Political Finance in Developing States

In developing countries, political activities are expensive. During campaigns, candidates and parties incur the costs of hiring sta↵, advertising, traveling and potentially buying votes. Between elections, citizens exert pressure to receive private benefits. Little is known, however, about how candidates and parties actually raise funds. These candidates often campaign on development platforms, promising citizens that they will deliver quality public goods. It is not clear, though, that the delivery of public goods is improving. To examine these problems, I investigate the case of Ghana. Devoting one year to field research, I observed the actions of political actors in 11 districts. I interviewed over 200 local elites, including politicians, bureaucrats, private business owners and traditional chiefs. I administered surveys to bureaucrats and gathered data on local development projects. Political financing and the quality of public–goods delivery are intertwined. Ghanaian politics is financed by an “iron square” of politicians, bureaucrats, construction contractors and party o\"cials who covertly extract funds from public procurement. Their actions reduce the funds available to build development projects, hinder the ability of citizens to monitor project quality and drive honest contractors out of the market. This system of political financing is ultimately sustained by the kinship obligations that each player must satisfy.

在发展中国家，政治活动耗资不菲。竞选期间，候选人和政党需承担雇佣工作人员、投放广告、开展巡回活动乃至可能存在的贿选成本。选举间歇期，公民会通过施压以换取私人好处。然而，目前学界对候选人和政党实际的筹款方式知之甚少。这类候选人通常以发展议题作为竞选纲领，向民众承诺将提供优质公共物品。但公共物品供给质量是否有所提升，尚无定论。
为探究上述问题，本研究以加纳为案例展开分析。本研究耗时一年开展实地调研，对11个选区的政治行动者的行为进行了观察。我共访谈了200余名地方精英，涵盖政客、官僚、私营企业主与传统酋长。我向官僚群体发放了调查问卷，并收集了地方发展项目的相关数据。
政治筹资与公共物品供给质量紧密交织。加纳的政治资金来源于由政客、官僚、建筑承包商与政党官员组成的“铁四角（iron square）”，他们通过公共采购环节暗中挪用资金。这类行为挤占了用于建设发展项目的资金，削弱了民众监督项目质量的能力，并将合规承包商挤出市场。这套政治筹资体系最终依靠各方参与者必须履行的亲属义务得以维系。