Replication Data for: Courts as extra-cabinet control mechanisms for secondary legislation: evidence from Italy

Ministers can have an incentive to adopt policies through secondary legislation that deviates from the gen- eral compromise reached via the primary legislation. We suggest that when secondary legislation is at stake, in some countries coalition partners can rely upon the ex-ante legal scrutiny of courts as an extra-cabinet control mechanism. We focus on the interaction between governments and the Council of State, the highest administrative court and the most important consultative body of the government in Italy. Our findings support the general hypothesis that the Council’s activism as an advisor is generated by the demand for control mechanisms on the secondary legislation. Such a demand is affected by specific political conditions, i.e. the level of government heterogeneity and government alternation. The findings on the Italian case can be a starting point for research on the different levels of involvement of adminis- trative courts in the executive politics that characterize European Democracies.

部长们可能存在借助次级立法（secondary legislation）推行政策的动机，而此类立法可能偏离通过主体立法（primary legislation）达成的一般性妥协。我们提出，当涉及次级立法时，部分国家的执政联盟伙伴可将法院的事前法律审查（ex-ante legal scrutiny）作为一种内阁外监督机制（extra-cabinet control mechanism）。本研究聚焦意大利政府与国务委员会（Council of State）的互动关系——后者既是该国最高行政法院，也是政府最重要的咨询机构。我们的研究结论支持如下一般性假说：国务委员会作为咨询机构的积极作为，源于针对次级立法的监督机制需求。此类需求受特定政治条件影响，具体包括政府异质性（government heterogeneity）程度与政权交替（government alternation）情况。本研究针对意大利案例所得出的结论，可作为探究欧洲民主国家行政法院在其典型行政政治中参与程度差异的研究起点。