Replication Data for: Question of Timing: Pre-Electoral Coalitions in Multiparty Presidential Regimes

This paper focuses on the timing of coalition formation under presidential systems. While elections in parliamentary regimes have recently been characterized by a high degree of uncertainty both in the results and the formation of cabinets, this is not the case for presidential politics. As a result, we argue that coalition cycles differ across systems of government. As a matter of fact, we argue that the process of coalition formation under presidentialism is more complicated. To test our claim, we look at forty-four multiparty governments in Latin America and Asia. We find that presidentialism — with its fixed mandate and its specific institutional mechanism for selecting the president — directly affects the ‘coalition life cycle’ and fosters a stronger propensity to pre-electoral agreements.

本研究聚焦总统制下的联盟组建时序问题。尽管近年来议会制国家的选举在结果与内阁组建层面均呈现高度不确定性，但总统制政治场景下却并非如此。据此，我们认为不同政体下的联盟周期存在差异。进一步而言，我们提出总统制下的联盟组建流程更为复杂。为验证上述论点，我们选取拉丁美洲与亚洲的44个多党政府作为研究样本。研究结果表明，总统制凭借其固定任期制度与特定的总统选举产生机制，直接影响「联盟生命周期（coalition life cycle）」，并显著提升了政党达成选举前协定的倾向。