Influence of elite rotation on authoritarian resilience

This article proposes the use of the indicator of elite rotation to deepen the understanding of the phenomenon of authoritarian cooptation. The high frequency of changes in the ruling coalition can have a twofold effect on authoritarian regimes. On the one hand, it makes it possible to include new leaders in the ruling coalition in a timely fashion, remove potential opponents and maintain loyalty among the nobility. On the other hand, constant rotation creates a situation of high uncertainty and deprives some elites of access to previously received benefits. This study offers an empirical test of these assumptions: an analysis of all authoritarian regimes that existed between 1968 and 2010 (as well as all dictators who ruled between 1968 and 2008) leads to the conclusion that a low level of elite rotation generally contributes to the resilience of authoritarian regimes and leaders.

本文提出采用精英轮换（elite rotation）指标，以深化对威权吸纳（authoritarian cooptation）现象的理解。执政联盟的高频更迭会对威权政权产生双重影响：一方面，此举可及时将新领导者纳入执政联盟，清除潜在反对势力，并维系统治集团内部的忠诚度；另一方面，持续的精英轮换会营造高度不确定的环境，并剥夺部分精英此前享有的既得利益。本研究对上述假设开展实证检验：通过对1968年至2010年间存续的所有威权政权（以及1968年至2008年间执政的所有独裁者）进行分析，得出结论：较低的精英轮换水平总体上有助于提升威权政权与执政者的存续韧性。