Replication data for: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. (JEL D63, D82, I23)

本文依托理论与实地数据，研究哈佛大学商学院（Harvard Business School）课程分配所采用的顺位分配机制（draft mechanism）。研究表明，该机制在理论层面具备策略操纵空间，现实中也确实存在操纵行为，且此类操纵会引发显著的福利损失。尽管如此，本文发现该机制下的社会福利仍高于其被广泛研究的防策略操纵（strategyproof）替代方案。本文揭示了公平性与福利之间的一种全新关联，这一关联解释了为何顺位分配机制即便存在策略行为成本仍能表现优异，并据此设计了一种可降低此类成本的新型顺位分配机制。此外，本文还就市场设计中的帕累托效率（Pareto efficiency）、公平性与策略防操纵性（strategyproofness）等议题，总结了若干具有更广泛适用性的经验启示。（JEL分类号：D63、D82、I23）