Replication Data for: Opposition Rule under Autocracy: Evidence from Russia

How does the opposition govern under autocracy? Most authoritarian regimes tolerate some degree of internal opposition, allowing it to contest and even take power. Yet we know little about how such power-sharing dynamics affect governance. In this paper, I exploit a unique instance where the opposition won control of political institutions in a prominent electoral autocracy: the 2017 Moscow municipal elections. Using a difference-in-differences design, I find that opposition control of municipal councils reduced the financial returns from office for ruling party deputies. This decrease in earnings comes from opposition-held councils removing rent-seeking opportunities by organizing more competitive procurement, reducing unnecessary budget expenditures, and curbing over-the-top compensation. Using a survey experiment, I then show that voters prefer opposition candidates with municipal governing experience over ruling party ones without it. Even in repressive environments, challenging autocratic rule may be well served by joining rather than boycotting institutions.

威权体制下的反对党如何执政？多数威权政权会容忍一定程度的内部反对力量，允许其参与竞争甚至掌权。然而，我们对这种权力共享动态如何影响治理知之甚少。本文利用了一个独特案例：在著名的选举威权体制中，反对党赢得了政治机构的控制权——2017年莫斯科市议会选举。通过双重差分设计（difference-in-differences design），我发现反对党控制的市议会降低了执政党代表的职务经济回报。这种收入下降源于反对党主导的议会通过组织更具竞争性的采购、削减不必要的预算支出和遏制过高薪酬，消除了寻租机会。通过一项调查实验，我进一步发现选民更倾向于有市政治理经验的反对党候选人，而非无此经验的执政党候选人。即使在压制性环境中，挑战威权统治的有效方式或许是加入而非抵制体制。