Replication Data for: The single‐party dictator's dilemma: Information in elections without opposition

The literature on authoritarian institutions points to nationwide elections as a mechanism for learning about the preferences of citizens. In using elections in this way, however, authoritarians face a trade-off between gathering reliable information and guaranteeing electoral victory. In this article, we explore how single-party regimes manage this trade-off and the particular types of information available to them. Using candidate level data from Vietnam, we demonstrate that single-party regimes, in particular, forsake information on overall regime support and strength of opposition in favor of information on the popularity of local notables and the compliance of local officials with central mandates. In addition, we show that ex ante electioneering is less risky than ex post fraud at achieving these goals.

有关威权制度的学术研究指出，全国性选举是了解公民偏好的一种机制。然而，以这种方式运用选举时，威权政权会陷入收集可靠信息与保障选举胜利之间的权衡困境。本文探讨一党制政权如何应对这一权衡难题，以及其可获取的特定类型信息。借助越南的候选人层级数据，我们的研究表明，一党制政权尤其会舍弃关于整体政权支持度与反对力量强弱的信息，转而获取有关地方名流受欢迎程度以及地方官员遵从中央政令情况的信息。此外，我们还证明，在达成上述目标方面，事前竞选活动比事后选举舞弊的风险更低。