Data for chapter 4

Abstract: Whistleblowing, i.e. the act of reporting illegal actions of an organisation by an employee, is an important tool to uncover corporate fraud. Previous experimental literature studied firms independently of each other. We hypothesise that competition between firms for market revenue may decrease whistleblowing. In an experiment, we use treatments with and without competition and find an insignificant reduction of whistleblowing under competition. We also investigate rationalisations used by participants to justify not blowing the whistle. We find that denial of responsibility plays an important role, and is slightly more strongly used under competition.The file contains raw data from the experiment as exported by the software.

摘要：举报（Whistleblowing），即雇员举报所在组织非法行为的行为，是揭露企业欺诈活动的重要工具。既往实验研究均独立考察单家企业的运行情况，未纳入企业间的竞争因素。本研究提出假说：企业间为争夺市场营收而展开的竞争可能会抑制举报行为。通过设置存在竞争与无竞争的实验处理组开展实验，本研究发现竞争环境下举报行为仅出现不显著的下降。本研究同时考察了参与者为不实施举报行为所使用的合理化解释策略，发现责任推脱（denial of responsibility）是其中的重要策略，且在竞争环境下该策略的使用比例略高。本文件包含实验软件导出的原始实验数据。