Replication Data for: The Political Economy of Financial Reform: de Jure Liberalization vs. de Facto Implementation

Over the past three decades, numerous countries have engaged in financial reform, prompting widespread interest in the sources of this development. Virtually all of the studies conducted on this topic, however, have focused on explaining neoliberal policy adoption in the financial sector, without addressing whether the adopted reforms actually generate neoliberal economic outcomes. This gap in the literature is important because many policy reforms are not implemented or enforced. In this article, we conduct one of the first studies of the conditions under which de jure financial reforms are implemented, yielding de facto financial liberalization. We argue that democracy inhibits de facto financial reform when society at large is dissatisfied with government. Under these circumstances, democratic officials may be tempted to announce but not to follow through on financial policy liberalization or be unable to follow through, either fearing or facing opportunistic political opposition from legislative or partisan veto players who either represent or seek the electoral support of interest groups harmed by implementing financial reforms. Based on an analysis of ninety countries from 1980–2005 corroborated by a series of illustrative case studies, we find considerable support for this argument.

过去三十年间，众多国家纷纷开展金融改革，这一趋势引发了学界对其动因的广泛关注。然而，几乎所有相关研究均聚焦于解释金融领域新自由主义政策的采纳，却未探讨这些已采纳的改革是否真正产生了新自由主义经济成果。文献中的这一缺口具有重要意义，因为许多政策改革并未得到落实或执行。本文首次探讨了法定金融改革（de jure financial reforms）得以实施并产生事实金融自由化（de facto financial liberalization）的条件。我们认为，当社会普遍对政府不满时，民主会抑制事实金融改革。在此情形下，民主制下的官员可能倾向于宣布金融政策自由化却不付诸实施，或因惧怕或面临来自立法机构或党派否决者的投机性政治反对而无法推进改革——这些否决者要么代表受金融改革实施损害的利益集团，要么寻求其选举支持。基于对1980至2005年间90个国家的分析，并辅以一系列说明性案例研究，我们的论点得到了充分支持。