Replication Data for: Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocations: The Role of Party Preferences

Resources for foreign aid come under attack when parties that care little for international affairs come to power. Internationally focused parties of the left and right, however, prefer to use aid as a tool to pursue their foreign policy goals. Yet varying goals based on left-right ideology differentiate the way donors use foreign aid. We leverage sector aid to test hypotheses from our Partisan Theory of Aid Allocation and find support for the idea that domestic political preferences affect foreign aid behavior. Left-internationalist governments increase disaster aid, while parochial counterparts cut spending on budget assistance and aid that bolsters recipients' trade viability. Conservative governments favor trade-boosting aid. We find consistent, nuanced, evidence for our perspective from a series of Error Correction Models and extensive robustness checks. By connecting theories of foreign aid to domestic politics, our approach links prominent but often disconnected, fields of political research and raises important questions for policymakers interested in furthering the efficacy of development aid.

当漠视国际事务的政党执政时，对外援助的资源往往会遭到抨击。然而，秉持国际主义立场的左右翼政党，更倾向于将援助作为推行外交政策目标的工具。但基于左右翼意识形态的不同政策目标，各援助国的对外援助实践路径也呈现出显著分化。我们借助部门援助数据，对我们提出的「援助分配党派理论」（Partisan Theory of Aid Allocation）中的假说进行检验，结果证实了「国内政治偏好会影响对外援助行为」这一核心观点。左翼国际主义政府会增加灾害援助的投入规模，而目光狭隘的同类政府则会削减预算援助及用于提升受援国贸易生存能力的援助支出。保守派政府则倾向于支持旨在提振受援国贸易的援助项目。我们通过一系列误差修正模型（Error Correction Models）与大量稳健性检验，为我们的研究视角提供了一致且细致入微的实证证据。本研究将对外援助理论与国内政治研究相结合，串联起了诸多虽具学术影响力却时常相互割裂的政治学研究领域，并为那些致力于提升发展援助效能的政策制定者提出了若干关键问题。