The models for three scenarios.

This study develops a dynamic game model to analyze subsidy mechanisms for sports tourism integrated destination (STID), examining interactions between a core operator (major projects) and multiple supporting operators (ancillary services). It compares three scenarios: no subsidy, investment-based subsidies (core operator only), and visitor-driven subsidies (tied to tourist numbers). Results show investment-based subsidies increase core operator spending but not supporting operators’ investments, while boosting tourist numbers and supporting operators’ profits. Visitor-driven subsidies benefit all operators, increasing investments, profits and tourist volumes. When subsidy budgets are equal, visitor-driven subsidies yield better outcomes across all metrics if demand fluctuations remain stable. Demand shocks amplify both subsidy types’ effectiveness. Findings suggest visitor-driven subsidies better coordinate tourism ecosystems, with demand volatility enhancing subsidy impacts, while core and supporting operators require differentiated policy approaches due to asymmetric responses.

本研究构建动态博弈模型，以分析体育旅游融合目的地（Sports Tourism Integrated Destination，STID）的补贴机制，考察核心经营主体（负责重大项目）与多家配套经营主体（提供辅助服务）之间的互动关系。研究对比了三类场景：无补贴场景、仅面向核心经营主体的基于投资的补贴场景，以及与游客数量挂钩的游客导向型补贴场景。结果表明，基于投资的补贴可提升核心经营主体的投入规模，但未带动配套经营主体的投资，却同时增加了游客数量与配套经营主体的利润；而游客导向型补贴则能惠及所有经营主体，可同步提升各方的投资、利润与游客规模。当补贴预算相等时，若需求波动保持稳定，游客导向型补贴在各项指标上均能取得更优效果。需求冲击会放大两类补贴的实施成效。研究结论显示，游客导向型补贴可更好地协调旅游生态系统，且需求波动性会增强补贴的作用效果；鉴于核心与配套经营主体的响应存在非对称性，二者需要差异化的政策支持方案。