Replication Files for "Killing in the Slums: Social Order, Criminal Governance, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro"

State interventions against organized criminal groups (OCGs) sometimes work to improve security, but often exacerbate violence. To understand why, this paper offers a theory about criminal governance in five types of criminal regimes -- Insurgent, Bandit, Symbiotic, Predatory, and Split. These differ according to whether criminal groups confront or collude with state actors; abuse or cooperate with the community; and hold a monopoly or contest territory with rival OCGs. Police interventions in these criminal regimes pose different challenges and are associated with markedly different local security outcomes. We provide evidence of this theory by using a multi-method research design combining quasi-experimental statistical analyses, automated text analysis, extensive qualitative research, and a large-N survey in the context of Rio de Janeiro's ``Pacifying Police Units" (UPPs), which sought to reclaim control of the favelas from criminal organizations.

针对有组织犯罪团伙（Organized Criminal Groups，简称OCGs）的国家干预行动，有时能够改善地区安全状况，但往往会加剧暴力冲突。为厘清这一现象背后的成因，本文提出了一套面向五种犯罪政权的犯罪治理理论：叛乱型（Insurgent）、匪帮型（Bandit）、共生型（Symbiotic）、掠夺型（Predatory）与分裂型（Split）。这些政权模式的差异源于三个核心维度：犯罪团伙与国家行为体之间是对抗还是勾结、对当地社区是侵害还是合作、对领地是形成垄断还是与敌对OCGs展开争夺。在上述不同犯罪政权模式下开展的警务干预，所面临的挑战各不相同，对应的地方安全治理结果也存在显著差异。本研究采用多方法研究设计，结合准实验统计分析、自动文本分析、大规模质性研究以及大样本调查，以里约热内卢旨在从犯罪组织手中夺回贫民窟控制权的‘和平警务单元（Pacifying Police Units，简称UPPs）’项目为研究场景，为上述理论提供了实证支撑。