Table1_Emission Reduction Strategies of a Low-Carbon Supply Chain Considering Product Substitution and Government Subsidy.DOCX

Under the background of the low-carbon economy, considering that manufacturers produce common products and low-carbon products simultaneously and the two products are substituting, three models are set up, namely, no government subsidy, subsidy based on the research and development (R&D) cost, and subsidy based on the production volume of low-carbon products. The Stackelberg game theory is used to analyze the optimal decision of the supply chain under the three methods of government subsidy, the influence of the correlation coefficient on optimal decision-making is discussed, and the effects of different government subsidy methods on the equilibrium solutions are compared and analyzed. Finally, the results are verified and illustrated by example analysis. The study found that the government subsidy reduces the sales volume of common products but increases the sales volume of low-carbon products, the emission reduction of unit low-carbon products, total emission reductions, and manufacturer’s profit. The unit emission reduction and total emission reductions are the highest when the government subsidies are according to the R&D cost, and the manufacturer’s profit is the highest when the government subsidies are according to the production volume of low-carbon products. Total emission reduction and supply members’ profit have a positive relationship with the subsidy coefficient and the sensitivity of consumers toward price difference and have a negative relationship with the R&D cost coefficient.

在低碳经济背景下，考虑到制造商同时生产普通产品与低碳产品且二者存在替代关系，本文构建了三类政府补贴模式下的供应链决策模型，分别为无政府补贴场景、基于研发（R&D）成本补贴场景以及基于低碳产品产量补贴场景。本文采用斯塔克尔伯格博弈论（Stackelberg game theory）分析三种补贴模式下供应链的最优决策，探讨相关系数对最优决策的影响，并对比分析不同政府补贴方式对均衡解的作用效果。最后通过案例分析对研究结果进行验证与说明。研究结果显示，政府补贴会降低普通产品的销量，但能提升低碳产品的销量、单位低碳产品减排量、总减排量与制造商利润。其中，以研发成本为补贴依据时，单位减排量与总减排量均达到最高水平；而以低碳产品产量为补贴依据时，制造商利润达到最高水平。总减排量与供应链各成员的利润均与补贴系数、消费者对价格差的敏感度呈正相关关系，与研发成本系数呈负相关关系。