Replication Data for: Painful Reforms, Punished Incumbents: The Politics of Economic Adjustment

We investigate the political fallout from economic reform programs and whether incumbent governments can soften the impact using social protection or scapegoating strategies. We test our arguments through a survey experiment in Pakistan and an analysis of World Values Surveys. The Pakistani experiment confirms that emphasizing the negative consequences of reform lowers incumbent support, while attempts to mitigate this backlash are ineffective. The cross-country data show that populations enduring harsher reform programs report lower satisfaction with national leaders. These findings inform economic voting theories in developing countries and policies regarding political backlash from IMF-backed adjustments.

本研究旨在探究经济改革方案所引发的政治效应，以及现任政府能否通过社会保护或替罪羊策略弱化改革带来的冲击。我们依托在巴基斯坦开展的调查实验与世界价值观调查（World Values Surveys）数据对核心论点进行实证检验。巴基斯坦的实验结果证实，强调改革的负面后果会降低民众对现任政府的支持率，而试图抵消这种反对声浪的举措并未产生有效作用。跨国数据分析显示，承受更为严苛的经济改革方案的民众，对本国国家领导人的满意度普遍更低。上述研究发现可为发展中国家的经济投票理论研究提供理论补充，同时可为国际货币基金组织（IMF）支持的经济调整政策相关的政治反弹应对提供政策参考。