SOE firms’ duality effect on visits.

In this research, we use Chinese stock exchange listed firm data to explore the relationship between institutional analysts’ firm visits and firms’ risk-taking as measured by earnings quality. The results show that more frequent visits in the previous year increase managers’ risk-taking decisions in later years and that firms experience lower earnings quality. Interestingly, the concentration of shareholding and management power, traditionally believed to be negative corporate governance instruments, alleviate such risk-taking if a firm is a state-owned enterprise (SOE). For non-SOEs, the more concentrated the shareholding and management power the further the risks increase. These results are attributed to the political connection of the manager, which would make managers more risk averse when under market focus and minimize risks that would damage their reputation and political career.

本研究采用中国证券交易所上市企业数据，探究机构分析师实地调研与企业风险承担行为之间的关联，其中企业风险承担以盈余质量作为衡量指标。研究结果显示，上一年度分析师实地调研频次越高，后续年度企业管理层的风险承担决策水平越高，同时企业盈余质量也会相应降低。值得注意的是，传统观点认为股权与经营权集中度属于有损公司治理的因素，但当企业为国有企业（state-owned enterprise, SOE）时，该因素反而能够抑制上述风险承担行为；而对于非国有企业而言，股权与经营权集中度越高，企业的风险承担水平则会进一步提升。上述研究结果可归因于管理层的政治关联：当企业处于市场关注之下时，管理层会更为规避风险，进而尽可能规避那些会损害自身声誉与政治仕途的风险。