Paying off the Competition: Contracting, Market Power, and Innovation Incentives
收藏NBER2021-06-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
下载链接：
https://www.nber.org/papers/w28964
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资源简介：
This paper explores the relationship between a firms legal contracting environment and its innovation incentives. Using granular data from the pharmaceutical industry, we examine a contracting mechanism through which incumbents maintain market power: pay-for-delay agreements to delay the market
本文探讨了企业法律契约环境与其创新激励之间的关系。利用制药行业的细粒度数据，我们研究了在位企业维持市场力量的一种契约机制：即通过付费延迟协议（pay-for-delay agreements）来推迟市场
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2021-06-01
