Summary statistics.

Tax avoidance is a widespread problem, much explored in the literature. Using a sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2009 to 2021, this study finds that analyst coverage significantly inhibits corporate tax avoidance behavior, mainly by improving the information environment and alleviating agency problems. Further analysis finds that the role of analyst coverage is more significant in firms where investment in innovation is limited, state-owned enterprises, and those with low management shareholding. The paper enriches the relevant literatures about analyst coverage and corporate tax avoidance, identifies the potential to inhibit corporate tax avoidance from the perspective of information environment and agency costs and provides suggestions for regulators and corporate governance.

避税行为是学界广泛探讨的普遍性问题。本研究以2009至2021年中国A股上市公司为样本，实证发现分析师跟踪（Analyst Coverage）可显著抑制企业避税行为，其核心作用机制为改善企业信息环境与缓解代理问题。进一步分析显示，在创新投入受限、国有企业以及管理层持股比例较低的企业中，分析师跟踪的抑制作用更为显著。本研究丰富了分析师跟踪与企业避税相关领域的文献，从信息环境与代理成本视角揭示了抑制企业避税的可行路径，并为监管机构与公司治理提供了参考建议。