Replication Data for: How Electoral Institutions Shape Citizen Participation and Legislative Behavior

The electoral system is often treated as fixed, but throughout U.S. history significant changes in electoral institutions, or in political conditions dictated by electoral institutions, make it possible to identify more precisely the role that the electoral system plays in the democratic process. This dissertation examines three related questions, each focusing on a different aspect of the influence of electoral rules on political behavior. How has the ability to directly elect representatives influenced other forms of citizen engagement with government? For a given election, how has competitiveness influenced voter turnout? Finally, when separate elections lead to differences in partisan control over the branches of government, what is the effect on policymaking in Congress? The first chapter shows that petitioning campaigns have historically substituted for the communication and accountability obtained through direct elections. I estimate that rates of petitioning to the Senate declined by 30\% when the passage of the 17th Amendment ended the practice of indirect election by state legislatures and replaced it with direct elections. The implication is that electoral reforms meant to improve representation may weaken other ties between citizens and lawmakers. The second chapter examines the relationship between electoral competition and turnout. Past research has consistently found that citizens vote at higher rates in response to closer elections, either through instrumental voting at the individual level or through voter mobilization by elites. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates that citizens living in competitive congressional districts differ markedly from those in uncompetitive districts along a range of dimensions other than turnout. Using an individual panel based on voter files from all 50 states and exploiting variation in competitiveness induced by the 2012 redistricting cycle yields a precisely estimated null effect of competitiveness on turnout. This finding suggests that neither instrumental voting nor elite mobilization theories operate as previously held in this context. The third chapter re-examines whether divided government reduces legislative productivity. After developing the most comprehensive database to date of significant acts of Congress---from 1789-2010---this chapter shows that unified control corresponds with one additional significant act passed per Congress in the 19th Century and four additional such acts in the 20th Century. However, party control of government cannot explain the broad historical trends in the rate at which Congress passes significant legislation.

选举制度（electoral system）常被视作固定不变，但纵观美国历史，选举制度本身或选举制度所决定的政治环境所发生的重大变革，使得我们能够更为精准地识别选举制度在民主进程中所发挥的作用。本博士论文探讨了三个相关问题，每个问题均聚焦于选举规则对政治行为影响的不同维度：直接选举议员的机制，对公民参与政府治理的其他形式产生了怎样的影响？就单次选举而言，选举竞争程度如何影响选民投票率（voter turnout）？最后，当分立选举导致政府各分支的党派控制权出现差异时，这对美国国会（Congress）的立法决策会产生何种效应？

第一章研究表明，历史上请愿活动曾替代通过直接选举所获得的沟通渠道与问责机制。经估算，随着美国第十七条宪法修正案（17th Amendment）的通过，州议会间接选举参议员的制度被直选制度取代，向参议院发起的请愿率下降了30%。这一结果意味着，旨在优化代议制的选举改革，可能会削弱公民与立法者之间的其他联结纽带。

第二章探讨选举竞争与选民投票率之间的关联。既往研究一致发现，选民会在竞争更激烈的选举中提高投票率，这一现象既可通过个体层面的工具性投票加以解释，也可归因于精英群体开展的选民动员活动。与之形成鲜明对比的是，本章证实，居住在竞争激烈的国会选区的选民，除投票率之外，在其他诸多维度上均与非竞争性选区的选民存在显著差异。本章利用覆盖美国50个州选民档案的个体面板数据，并借助2012年选区重划周期所带来的竞争程度变化，精准估算出选举竞争对投票率并无显著影响的零效应结果。这一发现表明，在这一研究场景中，此前所秉持的工具性投票理论与精英动员理论均不成立。

第三章重新审视分立政府是否会降低立法成效。本章构建了截至2010年、涵盖1789年至2010年期间美国国会重要立法法案的迄今最全面的数据库，研究发现，一党统一控制政府的情况，在19世纪会使每届国会额外通过1项重要法案，在20世纪则会额外通过4项此类法案。然而，政府的党派控制权，并不能解释美国国会通过重要立法的速率所呈现的整体历史趋势。