Replication Data for: Party Competition and the Inter-Industry Structure of U.S. Trade Protection

Why do some declining industries receive more compensation through protectionist policies than others, even without actively engaging in lobbying? How does the political representation of industries affect their chances for protectionist relief? This paper argues that political parties seek to optimize electoral returns through the strategic allocation of distributive benefits generated by trade barriers. The inter-industry structure of protection is thus explained by the interaction between industries’ trade preferences and political characteristics. Using data on protection and subnational employment for U.S. industries and district-level election outcomes in the 1990s, this paper finds that the concentration of industries in competitive constituencies not only increases their chances of receiving higher tariffs, but also magnifies the marginal effect of comparative disadvantage on tariff and nontariff protection.

为何部分衰退行业无需主动游说，就能比其他行业获得更多贸易保护政策补偿？行业的政治代表如何影响其获得贸易保护纾困的概率？本文提出，政党会通过战略分配贸易壁垒所产生的分配性收益，以优化选举收益。因此，贸易保护的行业间结构，可通过行业贸易偏好与政治特征之间的互动加以解释。本文利用1990年代美国各行业的贸易保护数据、次国家级就业数据以及选区层面选举结果数据，研究发现：行业在竞争性选区的集中度，不仅会提升其获得更高关税的概率，还会放大比较劣势对关税与非关税贸易保护的边际影响。