Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm
收藏NBER2013-09-01 更新2025-01-04 收录
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w19412
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资源简介：
Due to the limited availability of firm-level compensation data, there is little empirical evidence on the impact of compensation plans on personal productivity. We study an international law firm that moves from high-powered individual incentives towards incentives for "leadership" activities that
由于企业层面薪酬数据的可得性有限，关于薪酬计划对个人生产率的影响，目前实证证据较为匮乏。我们研究了一家国际律所，该律所正从高强度的个人激励机制转向针对“领导力”活动的激励机制，这些活动
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2013-09-01
