Institutional investors’ SVs and corporate ICFS.

Taking Chinese non-financial A-share companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) between 2003 and 2018 as a sample, this paper empirically examines whether and how institutional investors’ site visits (SVs) affect corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). The results show that institutional investors’ SVs can reduce ICFS, and this effect is more obvious for companies with fewer investment opportunities, larger sizes, higher internal cash flows, and higher agency costs, indicating that institutional investors’ SVs primarily inhibit ICFS caused by agency conflicts rather than financing constraints. In addition, the inhibitory effect of institutional investors’ SVs on ICFS exists mainly in companies with poor internal supervision governance and weak executive compensation incentive mechanisms, indicating that institutional investors’ SVs and other forms of corporate governance mechanisms operate as substitutes in reducing ICFS. This paper reveals the important role of institutional investors’ SVs in reducing ICFS, with important theoretical and practical implications for regulators to progressively regulate and promote this form of investor activity.

本文以2003年至2018年在深圳证券交易所（Shenzhen Stock Exchange, SZSE）上市的中国非金融A股上市公司为研究样本，实证检验了机构投资者实地调研（site visits, SVs）对企业投资-现金流敏感性（investment-cash flow sensitivity, ICFS）的影响及其作用路径。研究结果显示，机构投资者实地调研能够降低企业投资-现金流敏感性，且该抑制效应在投资机会匮乏、企业规模较大、内部现金流充裕以及代理成本较高的样本企业中更为显著。这表明，机构投资者实地调研主要通过抑制代理冲突引发的企业投资-现金流敏感性发挥作用，而非缓解融资约束引致的此类敏感性。此外，机构投资者实地调研的抑制作用主要集中于内部监督治理不完善、高管薪酬激励机制薄弱的企业，这说明机构投资者实地调研与其他形式的公司治理机制在降低企业投资-现金流敏感性方面存在替代效应。本文揭示了机构投资者实地调研在缓解企业投资-现金流敏感性中的重要作用，对于监管部门逐步规范并引导此类投资者活动具有重要的理论与实践价值。