Electoral Turnover and Government Efficiency: Evidence from Federal Procurement

The president's dominant influence on administrative policymaking has sparked public concerns about resulting inefficiencies at federal agencies. I examine how the possibility of future electoral turnover can limit agencies' engagement in presidential favoritism, focusing on policy areas where Congress can use informal means to constrain agencies' actions under the separation of powers system. In those areas, forward-looking agencies might alter their behavior to accommodate future constraints from the opposition Congress, even given substantial presidential influence. I evaluate these incentives using federal contract data in the United States. I find that as the probability of congressional turnover increases, federal agencies under unified government are more likely to award lower-cost contracts through competitive bidding in the expectation that the future Congress might compel agencies to abandon non-competitive contracts given to firms politically connected to the president. My findings challenge the dominant perspective that electoral turnover necessarily degrades bureaucratic performance.

总统对行政决策的主导性影响已引发公众对联邦机构由此产生的效率低下问题的担忧。本文探讨未来选举更替的可能性如何限制机构对总统偏袒行为的参与，重点聚焦于三权分立体系下国会可通过非正式手段约束机构行动的政策领域。在这些领域中，即便面临强大的总统影响力，具有前瞻性的机构仍可能调整其行为，以适应未来反对党国会施加的约束。本文利用美国联邦合同数据评估这些动机，研究发现：随着国会更替概率的上升，统一政府下的联邦机构更倾向于通过竞争性招标授予低成本合同——这是因为它们预期未来国会可能迫使机构放弃那些授予与总统存在政治关联企业的非竞争性合同。本文的研究结果挑战了选举更替必然降低官僚绩效这一主流观点。