Personal Power Dynamics in Bargaining
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https://www.nber.org/papers/w27981
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We study bargaining between a fixed agenda-setter and responder over successive issues. If the responder rejects the setters proposal, the setter can attempt to assert her will to implement her ideal and will succeed with a probability that depends on her personal power. Players learn about the
我们研究固定议程设定者与回应者之间就连续议题展开的议价行为。若回应者拒绝议程设定者的提案，设定者可尝试主张其意志以落实自身理想方案，且成功概率取决于其个人权力。参与者会了解到
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美国国家经济研究局创建时间：
2020-10-01
