In defense of Ricoeur's hermeneutic interpretation of Freud's psychoanalysis

This paper re-examines the phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis debate, presenting and defending Ricoeur's hermeneutical interpretation. Hermeneutical interpretation of Freud's psychoanalysis, particularly that of Freud's notion of the unconscious, is often taken to be bounded to linguistic representation without any direct access of self-knowledge. This paper argues, on the contrary, that there should be no presumption in favour of the phenomenological interpretation (or precisely Henry's interpretation), but that a careful study of Ricoeur's hermeneutical interpretation suggests that it can avoid the criticisms and objections raised by its competitors. (1) I characterize Henry's phenomenological interpretation of Freud's unconscious to his criticism of Ricoeur's hermeneutical interpretation of psychoanalysis, (2) I present a defence of Ricoeur's hermeneutical interpretation in terms of two central arguments (the twofold language argument and non-reductionist argument), (3) I respond to a number of influential objections to Ricoeur's hermeneutical interpretation, and (4) I sketch a proposal to the reconciliation of phenomenology and hermeneutics.

本文重新审视了精神分析的现象学-解释学阐释之争，呈现并辩护了利科的解释学阐释。对弗洛伊德精神分析的解释学阐释（尤其是对其无意识概念的阐释），常被认为局限于语言表征，而无法直接通达自我认识。然而本文主张，不应预设现象学阐释（确切而言即亨利的阐释）具有优先性；通过细致考察利科的解释学阐释可知，它能够规避其竞争者提出的各类批评与反驳。（1）笔者将亨利对弗洛伊德无意识的现象学阐释与其对利科精神分析解释学阐释的批评相勾连并加以刻画；（2）笔者基于两个核心论证（双重语言论证与非还原论论证）为利科的解释学阐释辩护；（3）笔者回应了针对利科解释学阐释的若干具有影响力的反驳；（4）笔者勾勒了现象学与解释学调和的初步方案。