Data and Code for: "Fiscal Rules and the Sovereign Default Premium"

We use a sovereign default model to study fiscal rules. A debt-brake (spread-brake) rule imposes a ceiling on the fiscal deficit when the sovereign debt (spread) is above a threshold. For our benchmark calibration, similar welfare gains can be achieved withthe optimal debt or spread brake. However, for a “Union” of heterogeneous economies, a common spread brake generates larger welfare gains than a common debt brake. Furthermore, gains from abandoning a common debt brake may be significant for economies that are unnecessarily constrained by it, suggesting it could be difficultto commit to a common debt rule in the Union. In contrast, abandoning a common spread brake would generate welfare losses on all member economies, facilitating commitment to a common spread rule. Even if we could tailor fiscal rules to a single economy, a spread brake would be a better option when there is uncertainty about key characteristics of this economy or these characteristics may change over time.

我们采用主权违约模型（sovereign default model）研究财政规则（fiscal rules）。债务刹车（debt-brake）规则会在主权债务（sovereign debt）高于阈值时对财政赤字设置上限，利差刹车（spread-brake）规则则会在主权利差（spread）高于阈值时对财政赤字设置上限。在基准校准（benchmark calibration）下，最优债务刹车规则与最优利差刹车规则可实现相近的福利收益。然而，针对由异质性经济体组成的“联盟”，共同利差刹车规则相较共同债务刹车规则能够带来更高的福利收益。此外，对于那些被共同债务刹车规则过度约束的经济体而言，放弃共同债务刹车规则可能会带来显著的福利改善，这表明在该联盟中，承诺遵守共同债务规则存在一定难度。与之形成鲜明对比的是，放弃共同利差刹车规则会对所有成员国造成福利损失，这将更有利于推动各成员国承诺遵守共同利差规则。即便我们能够为单个经济体定制财政规则，当该经济体的关键特征存在不确定性，或这些特征随时间推移发生变化时，利差刹车规则仍是更优选择。