Supplementary information files for "Entry limiting agreements: First-mover advantage, authorized generics, and pay-for-delay deals"

Supplementary files for article "Entry limiting agreements: First-mover advantage, authorized generics, and pay-for-delay deals"<br><br>During patent litigation, pay-for-delay (P4D) deals involve a payment from a patent holder of a branded drug to a generic drug manufacturer to delay entry and withdraw the patent challenge. In return for staying out of the market, the generic firm receives a payment, and/or an authorized licensed entry at a later date, but before the patent expiration. We examine why such deals are stable when there are multiple potential entrants. We combine the first-mover advantage for the first generic with the ability of the branded manufacturer to launch an authorized generic (AG) to show when P4D deals are an equilibrium outcome. We further show that limiting a branded firm's ability to launch an AG before entry by a successful challenger will deter such deals. However, removing exclusivity period for the first generic challenger will not.<br>© The Authors, CC BY 4.0

论文《限制进入协议：先发优势、授权仿制药与延迟支付协议》的补充文件

专利诉讼期间，延迟支付（pay-for-delay，P4D）协议涉及品牌药专利持有人向仿制药制造商支付费用，以推迟其市场进入并撤回专利挑战。作为不进入市场的回报，仿制药企业会获得一笔付款，和/或在日后（但早于专利到期日）获得授权许可进入市场的机会。我们研究了当存在多个潜在进入者时，此类协议为何能够保持稳定。我们将首个仿制药企业的先发优势与品牌药制造商推出授权仿制药（authorized generic，AG）的能力相结合，以揭示P4D协议在何种情况下会成为均衡结果。我们进一步发现，限制品牌药企业在成功挑战者进入市场前推出AG的能力，将阻止此类协议的达成；但取消首个仿制药挑战者的排他期，则不会产生这一效果。

© 作者所有，采用CC BY 4.0许可协议