Replication data for: The Dynamic Efficiency Costs of Common-Pool Resource Exploitation

We conduct the first empirical investigation of common-pool resource users' dynamic and strategic behavior at the micro level using real-world data. Fishermen's strategies in a fully dynamic game account for latent resource dynamics and other players' actions, revealing the profit structure of the fishery. We compare the fishermen's actual and socially optimal exploitation paths under a time-specific vessel allocation policy and find a sizable dynamic externality. Individual fishermen respond to other users by exerting effort above the optimal level early in the season. Congestion is costly instantaneously but is beneficial in the long run because it partially offsets dynamic inefficiencies. (JEL D24, Q21, Q22)

本研究首次基于真实世界数据，从微观层面实证考察公共池塘资源（common-pool resource）使用者的动态策略行为。渔民在完全动态博弈中的策略将潜在资源动态变化与其他参与者的行动均纳入考量，进而揭示了渔业的盈利结构。我们对比了特定时段船只分配政策框架下渔民的实际捕捞开发路径与社会最优开发路径，发现了显著的动态外部性。个体渔民会通过在捕捞季初期付出高于最优水平的捕捞努力，对其他使用者的行为做出响应。拥挤效应会产生瞬时成本，但从长期来看却具有积极作用——因其能够部分抵消动态无效率所带来的影响。（JEL D24, Q21, Q22）