Replication Data for: Did Georgian Voters Desire Military Escalation in 2008? Experiments & Observations

In a foreign policy crisis between a strong and weak state, do citizens of the weaker party punish or reward a leader that escalates the crisis? Strong evidence suggests that there were electoral incentives for Georgian escalation in its August 2008 war with Russia. This paper combines data from survey experiments, conducted on Georgian voters just weeks prior to the August 2008 war, with open-ended survey response questions from a survey fielded just weeks after the war. Respondents evaluated their leader's crisis behavior in the aftermath of a real war differently than the evidence from pre-war survey experiments would have suggested. The divergence in findings is demonstrated by providing evidence of three empirical phenomena: a ``Rally 'Round The Flag\" effect, a ``Fog Of War\" effect, and systematic differences in evaluations of leader performance depending on respondents' proximity to actual violence.

在强国与弱国之间的外交政策危机情境中，弱方公民是否会惩罚或奖赏升级危机的领导人？已有充分证据显示，在2008年8月格鲁吉亚与俄罗斯的战争中，格鲁吉亚的危机升级行动存在选举激励动因。本文结合了两组调研数据：一组为2008年8月战争爆发前数周，针对格鲁吉亚选民开展的调查实验（survey experiments）数据；另一组为战后数周实施的调研中，开放式问卷应答问题（open-ended survey response questions）的应答数据。与战前调查实验的预期结论相比，受访者在真实战争结束后对本国领导人危机应对行为的评价存在显著偏差。本文通过三类经验现象的实证证据，验证了这一研究发现的分歧：一是「拥旗效应（Rally 'Round The Flag）」，二是「战争迷雾效应（Fog Of War）」，三是受访者的亲身暴力接触程度会系统性影响其对领导人履职表现的评价。