Replication Data for: Investor Rights versus Human Rights: Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Tilt the Scale?

We argue that the broad and legally enforceable protection offered to foreign investors by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) worsens the human rights practices of developing countries. BITs lock-in initial conditions attractive to investors that are linked to vertical investment flows and investment and trade competition. BITs also constrain the provision of welfare benefits or basic infrastructure. The lock-in and constraining effects are sources of popular grievance and dissent in states that host foreign investment. BIT protected investor rights, however, limit the ability of governments to back-down vis-à-vis investors, lowering the relative cost of human rights violations. Finally, we explain that democratic regimes mitigate the negative effect of BITs. Evidence from 113 developing countries from 1981 to 2009 supports our hypotheses.

我们认为，双边投资协定（Bilateral Investment Treaties，BITs）为外国投资者提供的广泛且具有法律强制力的保护，会损害发展中国家的人权实践。双边投资协定会锁定对投资者具有吸引力的初始条件，这类条件与垂直型投资流动、投资及贸易竞争密切相关。此外，双边投资协定还会限制政府提供社会福利与基础设施的能力。这种锁定效应与限制效应，会在接纳外国投资的国家引发民众的不满与异议。然而，受双边投资协定保护的投资者权利，会限制政府在与投资者交涉时做出让步的空间，进而降低侵犯人权行为的相对成本。最后，我们论证了民主政体能够缓解双边投资协定带来的负面影响。基于1981年至2009年间113个发展中国家的实证数据，我们的研究假设得到了验证。