Replication Data for: How do International Peacekeeping Operations Affect External Support in Civil Wars

In recent years, scholars have widely attributed the protracted nature of civil wars to external involvement and intervention. Conventional wisdom holds that international peacekeeping operations can effectively deter and prevent third-party support for civil wars. However, this view lacks systematic evidence and empirical support. This article argues that since the deployment of peacekeeping operations largely depends on the consent of the host government in the civil war-torn country, it can exert asymmetric effects on the government and rebel groups, leading to increased external support for rebel groups. On the one hand, the presence of international peacekeepers can reinforce the perception among rebel groups and their potential external supporters that the balance of power is shifting towards the government, thereby inciting increased support for the rebels. On the other hand, peacekeeping operations increase international attention to the host government, raising the reputational and audience costs for the government and its third-party supporters when violating international norms, thus subjecting them to more constraints and potentially reducing direct third-party support for the host government. Utilizing the civil war dataset from 1992 to 2017, this article employs various quantitative methods to examine the impact of United Nations (UN) and non-UN peacekeeping operations on external support for governments and rebel groups respectively in civil war countries. Statistical results reveal that both UN and non-UN peacekeeping operations significantly increase external support for rebel groups rather than host governments, and drive a shift in external support from direct means such as troop deployment to indirect means such as the provision of weapons and funds. These findings have important implications for understanding the dynamics of external support during civil wars and for enhancing the effectiveness of international peacekeeping operations. 近年来，学界普遍认为外部力量的介入是内战久拖未决的主要因素之一。传统观点指出，国际维和行动能够有效威慑和阻止外部力量对内战的支持。然而，这一观点缺乏系统性的证据和经验支持。部署维和行动很大程度上依赖于内战国政府的同意，而这可能对内战国政府和反叛组织产生非对称影响，进而导致外部力量增加对反叛组织的支持。一方面，国际维和行动的部署会强化反叛组织及其潜在外部支持者的认知，即政府与反叛组织之间权力平衡向政府倾斜，从而促使外部力量更加积极地支持反叛组织。另一方面，维和行动客观上更需要政府支持与合作。这增加了国际社会对政府关注程度，以及外部力量支持政府时面临的外部约束和声誉成本。因此，外部力量更有动机减少对政府的支持。本文借助1992—2017年间全球内战国家样本数据，通过多种定量研究方法系统检验了联合国与非联合国维和行动对内战国家中政府与反叛组织分别获得外部支持的影响。统计结果发现，联合国与非联合国维和行动均显著增加了外部力量对反叛组织而非对内战国政府的支持，并推动外部支持由出兵等直接方式向提供武器资金等间接方式转变。这些发现对于系统理解内战中外部支持的动态变化，以及提升国际维和行动的效果具有重要启示意义。

近年来，学界普遍将内战迁延不决的成因归因于外部势力的介入与干预。传统观点认为，国际维和行动可有效威慑并阻止第三方为内战提供支持，然而该观点缺乏系统性证据与实证支撑。本文认为，由于维和行动的部署在很大程度上依赖于饱受内战蹂躏的东道国政府的同意，其会对东道国政府与反叛组织产生非对称影响，进而导致外部势力加大对反叛组织的支持力度。一方面，国际维和人员的存在会强化反叛组织及其潜在外部支持者的认知，即双方实力对比正朝着有利于东道国政府的方向倾斜，从而刺激外部势力加大对反叛组织的支持；另一方面，维和行动会提升国际社会对东道国政府的关注度，使得该政府及其第三方支持者在违反国际规范时面临更高的声誉成本与受众成本，进而受到更多约束，有可能减少第三方对东道国政府的直接支持。本文采用1992年至2017年的内战数据集，运用多种定量研究方法，分别检验了联合国 (United Nations) 与非联合国维和行动对内战国家中东道国政府及反叛组织所获外部支持的影响。统计结果显示，无论是联合国还是非联合国维和行动，均显著提升了外部势力对反叛组织的支持，而非对东道国政府的支持，并推动外部支持从出兵部署等直接方式，转向提供武器、资金等间接方式。上述研究发现对于理解内战期间外部支持的动态变化，以及提升国际维和行动的有效性具有重要意义。