Replication data for: "Congressional Voting on Funding the International Financial Institutions."

The United States is the largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, providing resources in exchange for voting power in these international financial institutions (IFIs). While the Treasury Department manages the day-to-day aspects of US participation in these institutions, Congress retains authority on funding. With the aim of understanding the microincentives of US support for the IFIs, I analyze congressional voting on bills to fund the IFIs. I argue that members of congress are more likely to support a funding increase (1) the more “liberal” their ideology, (2) the larger the share of campaign contributions they get from banks that specialize in international lending, and (3) the larger the share of voters that gain from economic globalization that reside in their districts. Statistical analyses of voting on five IFI funding bills since 1977 provide support for these arguments.

美国是国际货币基金组织（International Monetary Fund, IMF）与世界银行的最大出资国，通过提供资源以换取在这些国际金融机构（International Financial Institutions, IFIs）中的投票权。尽管美国财政部负责统筹美国参与上述机构的日常运营事务，但国会仍掌握资金拨付的最终决定权。为厘清美国支持国际金融机构的微观激励逻辑，本文针对国会就拨付国际金融机构资金的法案所开展的投票行为展开分析。本文提出如下论点：国会议员越倾向于支持增加资金拨付，当且仅当以下条件成立：（1）其意识形态立场愈发偏向“自由派”；（2）其竞选资金中来自专业从事国际借贷业务银行的占比越高；（3）其选区中受益于经济全球化的选民占比越大。对1977年以来五项国际金融机构资金拨付法案的投票结果开展的统计分析，为上述论点提供了实证支撑。