Data and Code for "School Boards and Education Production: Evidence from Randomized Ballot Order"

We examine the causal influence of educators elected to the school board on local education production. The key empirical challenge is that school board composition is endogenously determined through the electoral process. To overcome this, we develop a novel research design that leverages California's randomized assignment of the order that candidate names appear on election ballots. We find that an additional educator elected to the school board reduces charter schooling and increases teacher salaries in the school district relative to other board members. We interpret these findings as consistent with educator board members shifting bargaining in favor of teachers' unions.

本研究旨在探究当选学区教育委员会的教育工作者对当地教育生产的因果影响。核心实证识别挑战在于，学区教育委员会的人员构成通过选举流程内生决定。为克服这一识别难题，我们提出一种新颖的研究设计，借助加利福尼亚州对选举选票上候选人姓名排序的随机分配规则。研究结果显示，相较于其他委员会成员，新增一名当选教育委员会的教育工作者，会缩减学区内特许学校（Charter schooling）的办学规模，并提升学区内教师的薪资水平。我们将上述实证发现解读为：教育工作者出身的学区教育委员会成员会在劳资谈判中倾向于维护教师工会的利益，该结论与本研究的发现相一致。