Contract Design and Insurance Demand
收藏NBER2026-02-01 更新2026-02-14 收录
下载链接：
https://www.nber.org/papers/w34797
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资源简介：
We introduce experimental variation in the insurance contracts offered to rice farmers in China to study how contract design affects insurance takeup. We compare a single-contract offering with menus that include multiple contracts differing in premiums and payouts. Expanding the contract menu
本研究通过为中国水稻种植户设置差异化的保险合约实验处理，探究合约设计对保险参保率（insurance takeup）的影响。我们将单一合约投放模式，与包含多份保费与赔付条款各异的合约菜单模式进行对比。拓展合约菜单
提供机构：
美国国家经济研究局
创建时间：
2026-02-01
