Replication data for: How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment

We investigate the potential of transparency to influence committee decision-making. We present a model in which career concerned committee members receive private information of different type-dependent accuracy, deliberate, and vote. We study three levels of transparency under which career concerns are predicted to affect behavior differently and test the model's key predictions in a laboratory experiment. The model's predictions are largely borne out—transparency negatively affects information aggregation at the deliberation and voting stages, leading to sharply different committee error rates than under secrecy. This occurs despite subjects revealing more information under transparency than theory predicts.

本研究探讨了透明度对委员会决策的影响潜力。本文提出一个模型：其中关注职业发展的委员会成员接收具备不同类型依赖准确率的私人信息，随后开展审议并进行投票。我们研究了三种透明度层级，在此场景下职业关切对行为的影响存在显著差异，并通过实验室实验检验了该模型的核心预测。该模型的预测大体得到验证：透明度在审议与投票阶段对信息聚合产生负面影响，使得委员会的错误率与保密场景下存在显著差异。尽管实验参与者在透明度场景下披露的信息较理论预测更多，但该现象依然成立。