Replication Data for: Ballot Reform as Suffrage Restriction: Evidence from Brazil's Second Republic

Few innovations in democratic institutional design are considered as fundamental as the introduction of voting through the use of a uniform, official, and secret ballot. One account claims that the official ballot liberates dependent voters from the dictates of local elites, thereby enhancing democratic competition. Another argues that in contexts of widespread illiteracy its adoption may be tantamount to a suffrage restriction. This paper adjudicates between these views by drawing upon an original dataset of municipal-level voting returns from Brazil’s Second Republic (1945-1964). The unique staggered rollout of the official ballot during this period permits one to assess its impact with unprecedented accuracy. The article finds that the primary consequence of ballot reform was suffrage restriction. Rather than liberating poor and dependent voters, the official ballot made it exceedingly difficult for these individuals to vote. Moreover, parliamentary debates indicate that this was an anticipated and intended effect of the reform.

在民主制度设计领域，几乎没有哪一项革新能与采用统一、正式且无记名的选票（ballot）制度相提并论。一种观点认为，正式选票能让依附型选民（dependent voters）摆脱地方精英的操控，从而强化民主竞争。另一种观点则提出，在文盲率普遍较高的背景下，推行正式选票无异于对选举权施加限制。本文基于巴西第二共和国（1945-1964年）时期的市级投票结果原创数据集，对这两种对立观点进行评判。这一时期正式选票的独特分阶段推行机制，使得研究者能够以前所未有的精准度评估其政策影响。本文研究发现，选票改革的首要后果实则是限制了选举权。正式选票非但未能解放贫困依附型选民，反而极大地阻碍了这类群体行使投票权。此外，议会辩论记录表明，这一结果正是改革的预期且有意为之的政策效果。