Incentives to comply: the impact of national governments’ and stakeholders’ preferences on compliance with EU laws

Established explanations of differences in compliance outcomes highlight the policy preferences of implementers. The application of these theories to compliance with EU laws focuses on national governments and stakeholders. This study improves on existing conceptualisations of governments’ and stakeholders’ preferences by distinguishing between their incentives to deviate from, conform to and exceed the standards contained in EU laws. We apply these concepts to detailed evidence on national governments’ and stakeholders’ policy preferences and national governments’ transposition records. The study finds that incentives to conform and exceed are generally more frequent than incentives to deviate. Moreover, the policy preferences of national governments and stakeholders are linked, as governments’ preferences often agree with national stakeholders’ demands. Both national governments’ and stakeholders’ incentives to comply positively affect the timeliness of transposition.

现有关于合规结果差异的经典阐释，均强调执行主体的政策偏好。将此类理论应用于欧盟法律合规性研究时，研究聚焦于成员国政府与利益相关方。本研究针对现有政府与利益相关方偏好的概念化框架进行优化，通过区分二者偏离、遵守及超出欧盟法律既定标准的动机，完善了相关概念界定。本研究将上述分析概念应用于成员国政府与利益相关方政策偏好的详实实证资料，以及成员国政府的法律转化（transposition）记录的分析中。研究发现，遵守与超出标准的动机整体上较偏离标准的动机更为普遍。此外，成员国政府与利益相关方的政策偏好存在关联，政府的政策偏好往往与国内利益相关方的诉求相契合。成员国政府与利益相关方的合规动机，均对法律转化的及时性产生正向影响。