Executive venture capital selection.

In implementing the equity incentive system, this paper delves into the listed enterprises’ selection of equity incentive models. While previous research has extensively covered the effects, models, and influencing factors of equity incentives, there needs to be more in-depth literature focusing on the diverse incentive models and their impact on corporate performance. Notably, there needs to be more literature on considering entrepreneurial spirit as a mechanism. It aims to explore the relationship between executives’ choices under different incentive models, the entrepreneurial spirit fostered by these models, and their combined impact on corporate performance. The findings reveal that adopting the restricted stock incentive model by listed enterprises implementing the equity incentive system significantly positively affects enterprise performance. Mechanistic tests show that when a company implements the restricted stock incentive model, executives prioritize maximizing their interests, leading them to embrace more risk in their investment decisions. This behavior, in turn, stimulates the adventurous spirit of executives, positively impacting enterprise performance, particularly pronounced in companies with more concentrated executive power. Moreover, executives may be more inclined to invest in high-risk, high-reward innovative projects, a behavior indicative of innovation and more prevalent in firms with higher research and development (R&D) investment. However, the limitation of this paper is that the study evaluates the operation of the equity incentive system in China by taking listed companies in China as an example, which is not necessarily suitable for foreign developed capitalist countries. This study contributes to the study of principal-agent problems by exploring the relationship between executives, entrepreneurship and firm performance.

本文围绕股权激励（equity incentive）制度的实施场景，深入探讨上市公司的股权激励模式选择问题。尽管既往研究已对股权激励的实施效果、模式类型与影响因素展开了较为充分的探讨，但针对多元化股权激励模式及其对企业绩效的影响展开的深度研究仍较为匮乏。尤为值得关注的是，现有文献中鲜有将企业家精神作为传导机制的相关研究。本文旨在探究不同股权激励模式下高管的模式选择、该模式所培育的企业家精神，以及二者共同对企业绩效产生的影响之间的关联。研究结果表明，实施股权激励计划的上市公司若采用限制性股票（restricted stock）激励模式，将对企业绩效产生显著的正向影响。机制检验结果显示，当企业采用限制性股票激励模式时，高管会以自身利益最大化为首要目标，进而在投资决策中承担更多风险。这一行为反过来会激发高管的冒险精神，对企业绩效产生正向影响，且该效应在高管权力更为集中的企业中尤为显著。此外，高管更倾向于投资高风险高回报的创新项目，这一体现创新导向的行为在研发（Research and Development, R&D）投入较高的企业中更为普遍。不过，本文仍存在一定局限：本研究以中国上市公司为样本评估股权激励制度的运行效果，其结论未必适用于国外发达资本主义经济体。本研究通过探究高管行为、企业家精神与企业绩效之间的关联，丰富了委托代理问题的相关研究。