Democracy, Veto Player, and Institutionalization of Sovereign Wealth Funds

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have become important and controversial in global economy. We analyze why some SWFs have more encompassing and clearly specified governance rules than others. We argue that SWF institutionalization is structurally rooted in a country’s regime type and number of veto players in public policymaking. Democracy promotes SWF institutionalization by its need for strong rule of law, voters trying to constrain opportunistic behaviors of politicians, and the free flow of information. In contrast, the number of veto players has a curvilinear effect. When the number of veto players is very small, institutionalization is too rigid, constraining, and not preferred; when the number of veto players is moderate, it is optimal for veto players to manage their conflict over SWF governance in a more routine and institutionalized fashion; and when the number of veto players grows above a threshold, it becomes too costly to coordinate and produce mutually agreeable institutional rules. Our empirical analysis of 46 SWFs in 30 countries from 2007 to 2009 provides robust confirming evidence. SWF governance is more institutionalized and transparent in democracies and in countries with four veto players. Our research has important theoretical and policy implications for the ongoing debate over SWF.

主权财富基金（Sovereign Wealth Funds, SWFs）已成为全球经济中兼具重要性与争议性的议题。本研究旨在剖析为何部分主权财富基金的治理规则相较其他基金更为全面且界定清晰。我们认为，主权财富基金的制度化进程在结构上根植于一国的政体类型，以及其公共政策制定过程中的否决参与者（veto players）数量。民主制度之所以能推动主权财富基金的制度化，源于其对健全法治的需求、选民试图约束政客机会主义行为的诉求，以及信息的自由流动。与之形成对照的是，否决参与者的数量则呈现出曲线型影响效应：当否决参与者数量极少时，制度化进程会过于僵化且带有约束性，并非最优选择；当该数量处于中等水平时，否决参与者以更具常规性与制度化的方式化解围绕主权财富基金治理的冲突，为最优状态；而当否决参与者数量超过某一阈值时，协调各方并达成共识性的制度化规则所需成本将过高。我们对2007年至2009年间30个国家的46支主权财富基金开展的实证分析，提供了稳健且具有说服力的验证证据。民主国家以及拥有4名否决参与者的国家，其主权财富基金治理的制度化程度与透明度均更高。本研究针对当前围绕主权财富基金的持续讨论，具有重要的理论与政策启示价值。