The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix.

Online travel agency (OTA) platforms frequently engage in unfair behaviors that infringe on the legitimate rights and interests of consumers and airlines in the ticket sale market. Effective governance of the OTA platforms’ misconduct has become an urgent topic. In order to address the governance dilemma of OTA platforms’ misconduct, a tripartite evolutionary game model considering the collaborative supervision between airlines and consumers is constructed. This study analyzes the evolutionary path and stable strategy of the three participants, airlines, platforms and consumers by numerical simulation. The results show that some actions, such as airlines’ strict control of ticket sales resources and high fines on the platform, reducing the cost of customers’ rights protection, and effectively guiding online public opinion, can benefit airlines and consumers and enhance their willingness to cooperate in supervision. Legitimate consumer rights protection not only brings negative public opinion and image loss to airlines, but also to platforms, which can force airlines to impose stricter constraints on platforms and force platforms to strengthen self-restraint. Therefore, a market mechanism instead of government regulatory that can effectively suppress platforms misconduct should be established to promote platforms self-regulation through a collaborative effort between airlines and consumers. Some special measures that guide the interests of three participators are also provided.

在线旅游代理商（Online Travel Agency，OTA）平台在机票销售市场中时常出现侵害消费者与航空公司合法权益的不公平行为。有效治理OTA平台的违规行为已成为亟待解决的重要议题。为破解OTA平台违规行为的治理困境，本研究构建了考虑航空公司与消费者协同监管的三方演化博弈模型。本研究通过数值模拟分析了航空公司、平台、消费者三方参与主体的演化路径与稳定策略。研究结果表明，航空公司严格管控机票销售资源、对平台施以高额罚款，降低消费者维权成本，以及有效引导网络舆论等举措，均可使航空公司与消费者获益，并提升二者的协同监管意愿。消费者的合法维权行为，不仅会给航空公司与平台带来负面舆论与形象损失，还可倒逼航空公司强化对平台的约束，同时推动平台加强自我规制。因此，应构建可有效遏制平台违规行为的市场机制而非政府监管，通过航空公司与消费者的协同协作推动平台实现自我规制。本研究同时提出了兼顾三方参与主体利益的针对性优化举措。