Impact of carbon misreporting on renewable energy investment strategies of regulated power enterprises under cap-and-trade mechanism

In the context of carbon regulation, power enterprises (PEs) may engage in carbon misreporting to decrease apparent emissions and increase economic performance. This study builds a model to assess how misreporting affects renewable energy investment (REI) decisions under two allocation mechanisms: the total carbon quota (TCQ) mechanism and the unit carbon quota (UCQ) mechanism. By analysing the equilibrium solutions of both models, the following conclusions are obtained: (1) Compared with the TCQ mechanism, the UCQ mechanism provides a stronger incentive for REI; (2) When unit carbon quotas are large, the total power demand under the UCQ mechanism exceeds that under the TCQ mechanism. In contrast, when total carbon quotas are large, the TCQ mechanism yields greater profits than those under the UCQ mechanism; (3) Greater misreporting yields larger benefits for high-emission enterprises. However, increased misreporting becomes detrimental for low-emission enterprises.

在碳监管背景下，电力企业（power enterprises, PEs）可能通过碳误报（carbon misreporting）降低表观排放量并提升经济绩效。本研究构建模型，评估在两种配额分配机制——总碳配额（total carbon quota, TCQ）机制与单位碳配额（unit carbon quota, UCQ）机制下，误报行为对可再生能源投资（renewable energy investment, REI）决策的影响。通过分析两种模型的均衡解，得出以下结论：（1）与TCQ机制相比，UCQ机制对可再生能源投资的激励作用更强；（2）当单位碳配额较大时，UCQ机制下的总电力需求超过TCQ机制下的需求；反之，当总碳配额较大时，TCQ机制下的企业利润高于UCQ机制；（3）碳误报程度越高，对高排放企业越有利，但对低排放企业则产生不利影响。