Replication Data for: Connectivity, Clientelism and Public Provision

In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants’ votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants’ bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated.

在众多发展中国家，农村贫困人口往往依托庇护人作为中介，以获取政府提供的公共物品供给。该中介会促成公共物品供给，以此换取农民为政客投出选票。然而，农民议价能力低下，使得庇护人得以将公共资源据为己有。本文提出，通过将农民与村外市场建立联结，可提升其议价能力。本文借助巴基斯坦高速公路建设中形成的自然实验场景，研究发现：与孤立村庄相比，与村外市场联通的村庄所获得的公共物品供给水平显著更高。此外，本文还发现，联通所带来的利好影响对底层阶层最为显著——这类群体在村庄孤立时最易遭受剥削。