Replication Data for: The Politics of Agribusiness in Brazil: Business Power and Political Success during the 55th Legislature (2015-2019)

This paper addresses two central issues during the 55th legislature (2015-2019). First, the relationship between the instrumental and structural power of agribusiness and different aspects of parliamentary behavior, namely membership in standing committees and the introduction of legislative bills. Second, the level of success achieved by agribusiness in relation to the legislative production of the National Congress. Concerning the first question, we employed binary logistic regression to demonstrate that deputies who received the most campaign financing from agribusiness (an indicator of instrumental political power), and whose voters were highly dependent on agribusiness as a source of employment (an indicator of structural political power), were more likely to secure seats in the Committee on Agriculture, Livestock, Food Supply, and Rural Development (CAPADR). We also employed negative binomial regression to demonstrate that deputies whose constituents were more dependent on jobs created by the sector (structural political power) introduced a greater number of bills favorable to the sector, while introducing fewer bills contrary to its interests. Regarding the second issue, we utilized statistical techniques such as the chi-squared test and the analysis of adjusted residuals to compare the stance of the Agricultural Parliamentary Front (APF) with the decisions of the National Congress on bills concluded during the 55th Legislature. Our findings suggest that agribusiness attained success in the vast majority of decisions resulting in new laws, although many bills supported by the sector had different outcomes. In summary, the 55th Legislature demonstrated a high degree of receptiveness to the interests of agribusiness. However, while the interests of agribusiness wield considerable influence in the Brazilian Congress, this influence is far from all-encompassing.

本文探讨了第55届立法机构（2015-2019年）期间的两个核心问题。其一，农业综合企业的工具性权力与结构性权力，与议会行为不同维度（即常设委员会成员资格及立法提案的提出）之间的关系；其二，农业综合企业在国民大会立法成果中的成功程度。

针对第一个问题，我们采用二元逻辑回归（binary logistic regression）分析表明，从农业综合企业获得最多竞选资金（工具性政治权力的指标）、且其选民高度依赖农业综合企业作为就业来源（结构性政治权力的指标）的议员，更有可能在农业、畜牧业、食品供应及农村发展委员会（CAPADR）中获得席位。我们还采用负二项回归（negative binomial regression）分析发现，其选民更依赖该行业创造就业岗位（结构性政治权力）的议员，提出了更多有利于该行业的法案，同时提出的反对性法案更少。

针对第二个问题，我们运用卡方检验（chi-squared test）及调整残差分析等统计技术，比较了农业议会阵线（Agricultural Parliamentary Front, APF）的立场与国民大会对第55届立法机构期间完结法案的决策。研究结果表明，尽管该行业支持的许多法案结果各异，但农业综合企业在绝大多数促成新法律的决策中均取得了成功。

综上，第55届立法机构对农业综合企业的利益表现出高度的接受度。然而，尽管农业综合企业的利益在巴西国会中具有相当大的影响力，但其影响力远非无所不包。