Replication data for: Multiple Hands on the Wheel: Empirically Modeling Partial Delegation and Shared Control of Monetary Policy in the Open and Institutionalized Economy

Previous work showed that, when partially autonomous central banks (CBs) and politically responsive governments share monetary-policymaking control, inflation occurs as a convex combination of the rates that would have occurred if the government fully controlled monetary policy and if, instead, the CB had full control. Thus, the anti-inflation effects of CB autonomy and conservatism (CBA) depend on all political-economic variables to which CBs and governments would respond differently and, vice versa, the degree of CBA mutes the inflation effects of all such variables. This paper extends that logic of shared policy control to open political economies under differing exchange-rate regimes and degrees of international financial exposure. When domestic monetary authorities fully commit to fixed exchange-rates, they effectively delegate domestic inflation-control to foreign authorities. Similarly, in small, financially open economies, domestic policymakers must match domestic to foreign inflation to avoid massive exchange-rate pressures under any exchange regime. The new implications extend intuitively from the closed-economy case. Broadly, the domestic-inflation effects of pegs and financial exposure depend on each other and on many other institutional and structural characteristics of the domestic and foreign political economies, and, vice versa, the domestic-inflation effects of domestic and foreign political-economic conditions depend on exchange regimes and degrees of financial openness at home and abroad. The paper then shows how to model such complexly interactive hypotheses empirically compactly and substantively meaningfully and demonstrates that the postwar inflation records of 21 developed democracies decidedly favor such specifications over less theoretically- informed linear or linear-interactive alternatives . The conclusion illustrates several specific examples of this general result and discusses potential applications of this approach to other instances of shared policy-control.

既往研究表明，当部分自主的中央银行（central banks, CBs）与具有政治响应性的政府共享货币政策制定权时，通胀率会是两种情形下通胀率的凸组合：一种是政府完全掌控货币政策时的通胀率，另一种是中央银行完全掌控货币政策时的通胀率。因此，中央银行独立性与保守性（Central Bank Autonomy and Conservatism, CBA）的反通胀效应，取决于所有会让中央银行与政府产生差异化响应的政治经济变量；反之，中央银行独立性与保守性的程度会弱化上述所有这类变量对通胀的影响。
本文将这种共享政策制定权的逻辑拓展至不同汇率制度与国际金融敞口水平下的开放型政治经济体。当国内货币当局完全承诺实行固定汇率制度时，其实质上已将国内通胀调控权让渡给外国货币当局。类似地，在小型金融开放经济体中，无论采取何种汇率制度，国内政策制定者都必须使国内通胀率与外国通胀率趋同，以避免出现大规模汇率压力。
这一新的推论可从封闭经济情形直观推导而来。总体而言，固定汇率与金融敞口对国内通胀的影响彼此关联，同时也受国内外政治经济体的诸多制度与结构特征影响；反之，国内外政治经济条件对国内通胀的影响，则取决于本国与外国的汇率制度及金融开放程度。
本文随后展示了如何在实证层面既简洁又具备实质意义地对这类复杂交互性假说进行建模，并以21个发达民主国家的战后通胀数据为例，证明相较于理论依据不足的线性或线性交互模型变体，此类设定更符合实际数据。
结论部分列举了这一一般性结论的若干具体实例，并讨论了该研究方法在其他共享政策制定权场景中的潜在应用。