Replication Data for: When Reelection Increases Party Unity: Evidence from Parties in Mexico

It is often argued that when legislators have personal vote-seeking incentives, parties are less unified because legislators need to build bonds of accountability with their voters. I argue that these effects depend on a legislator's ability to cultivate a personal vote. When parties control access to the ballot and the resources candidates need to cultivate personal votes, they can condition a legislator's access to these resources on loyalty to the party's agenda. I test this theory by conducting a difference-in-differences analysis that leverages the staggered implementation of the 2014 Mexican Electoral Reform. This reform introduced the possibility of consecutive reelection for state legislators, increasing their incentives to cultivate personal votes. I study unity in position-taking and voting behavior of Mexican state legislators from 2012 to 2018. To analyze position-taking, I apply correspondence analysis to a new dataset of over half a million legislative speeches in 20 states. To study voting, I analyze over 14,500 roll-call votes in 14 states during the same period. Results show that reelection incentives increased intra-party unity, which has broad implications for countries introducing electoral reforms aiming to personalize politics. The analysis in the paper is based on votes and speech patterns. *Votes -Please see dofile replication_votes -Lines 13 to 3668 provide the code to calculate the proportion that a legislator votes with their party leader each month. These are calculated from the csv files in folders csv_01 and csv_02 (these correspond to the first and second legislature in the analysis for each state) -votes_m is the working file that stores the proportions -Running this produces the analysis file votes_clean.dta (also provided) -Main Paper Analysis uses votes_clean.dta and begins in line 3670 of replication_votes.do -Appendix Analysis begins in line 3828 -allvotesraw.dta is necessary to perform robustness check in Supp. Appendix Section A6 *Speeches -Please see dofile replication_speeches -File correspondance.dta contains the results from the correspondance analysis from raw text. Please note that the speech files occupy significant space, if you want them please contact me at luciam@wustl and we can arrange a data transfer. -Main Paper Analysis uses and begins in line 41 of replication_speeches.do -Appendix Analysis begins in line 230 -speak.dta is necessary to perform robustness check in Supp. Appendix Section A12.1 -leg_covariates.dta is necessary to perform robustness check in Supp. Appendix Section A10 -state_corr_mc.dta is necessary to perform robustness check in Supp. Appendix Section A7

学界普遍认为，当议员具备个人寻求选票的动机时，政党的凝聚力会有所下降，因为议员需要与选民建立问责纽带。本文则提出，此类效应取决于议员培育个人选票的能力。当政党掌控选票准入渠道以及候选人培育个人选票所需的资源时，它们可以将议员获取此类资源的资格与议员对政党议程的忠诚度挂钩。
本文通过采用双重差分法（Difference-in-Differences）分析，借助2014年墨西哥选举改革的渐进式实施场景对上述理论进行检验。该改革赋予州议员连续连任的可能性，强化了议员培育个人选票的动机。本文分析了2012至2018年间墨西哥州议员在立场表态与投票行为上的政党统一性。针对立场表态分析，本文对覆盖20个州的50余万份立法演讲数据集开展了对应分析；针对投票行为分析，本文同期分析了14个州的14500余份唱名表决记录。
研究结果表明，连任动机提升了政党内部的凝聚力，这对于旨在推动政治个人化的国家推行选举改革具有广泛的启示意义。
* 投票数据——请参阅Stata do文件replication_votes.do：
第13行至第3668行提供了计算议员每月与其本党领袖投票立场一致比例的代码，该计算基于文件夹csv_01与csv_02中的csv文件（分别对应分析中每个州的第一、第二届立法会议）。
votes_m为存储该比例的工作文件。运行该代码将生成分析文件votes_clean.dta（本文亦提供该文件）。
主论文分析使用votes_clean.dta，代码始于replication_votes.do的第3670行。
附录分析始于第3828行。
进行补充附录A6节的稳健性检验时，需用到allvotesraw.dta。
* 演讲数据——请参阅Stata do文件replication_speeches.do：
文件correspondance.dta包含基于原始文本开展对应分析的结果。请注意，演讲文件占用较大存储空间，若需获取相关文件，请通过邮箱luciam@wustl与我联系，我们将安排数据传输事宜。
主论文分析使用该数据集，代码始于replication_speeches.do的第41行。
附录分析始于第230行。
进行补充附录A12.1节的稳健性检验时，需用到speak.dta；进行补充附录A10节的稳健性检验时，需用到leg_covariates.dta；进行补充附录A7节的稳健性检验时，需用到state_corr_mc.dta。