Inter-Rebel Alliances in the Shadow of Foreign Sponsors

From the Patriotic Front struggle against the minority rule in Rhodesia to the seven-party mujaheddin alliance in Afghanistan, inter-rebel alliances make the armed opposition more resilient and successful in the face of government repression. Why then do some rebel groups cooperate with each other while others do not? Drawing on the principal-agent theory, I argue that the presence of foreign sponsors is likely to encourage alliance formation in civil wars especially when two rebel outfits share a state sponsor. Shared sponsors may demand cooperation between their agents and credibly threaten to punish them for non-compliance. They may also insist on the establishment of umbrella institutions to improve their monitoring and sanctioning capacity, and to increase the legitimacy of their agents. I test this argument using the UCDP Actor dataset with new data on alliances between rebel groups. I find strong evidence that shared sponsors increase the probability of inter-rebel alliance.

从罗德西亚（Rhodesia）的爱国阵线（Patriotic Front）反抗少数派统治的斗争，到阿富汗的七党圣战者联盟，反叛组织间的联盟能够大幅提升武装反对派在遭遇政府镇压时的韧性与作战成效。然则为何部分反叛组织会选择彼此合作，而其余组织却无此举动？本文依托委托-代理理论（principal-agent theory）提出：外国赞助者的存在会推动内战中的联盟形成，尤其当两支反叛组织拥有共同的国家赞助者时。共同的赞助者会要求其代理的反叛组织间开展合作，并可通过可信的惩罚威胁对不合作行为予以制裁。此类赞助者还可能推动建立统筹型联合机构，以强化自身的监督与制裁能力，并提升其代理组织的合法性。本文通过结合反叛组织联盟新数据的乌普萨拉冲突数据项目行为体数据集（UCDP Actor Dataset）对上述论点进行检验，结果提供了强有力的实证支撑：共同赞助者会显著提升反叛组织间结成联盟的概率。