Replication Data for: Individual Leaders and the State: The Case of Israel as a Complex Adaptive System

When Nathan Leites conceived of the Operational Code in 1951, he viewed it as the social-psychological construction of the state. Individuals in the Soviet Politburo did not operate based upon their own idiosyncrasies, but in similar ways that were derived from Lenin. However, much of the field of political psychology in IR has focused only on individual-level psychology, leaving out the social construction. In this paper we return to the idea of states as social entities that involve discussions, negotiations, and the influence of many people within a complex adaptive system (cas) made manifest as the “psychology of the state.” Many testable hypotheses emerge about continuity of the state’s psychology within and across administrations over time re: learning effects due to external causes (object appraisal); steering effects due to internal causes (ego defense); social interaction effects from learning and steering processes (self-other mediation). We investigate these possibilities by looking at the manifest psychology of the state across three disparate Israeli leaders: Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Benjamin Netanyahu. We use standard at-a-distance psychological assessments, based upon verbal materials, and employ the two most prolific psychological constructs in the field: Operational Code Analysis (cognition), and Leadership Trait Analysis (personality). The dependent variables in our analysis are key OCA beliefs of Israeli leaders about the nature of the political universe (friendly/ hostile), the most effective strategies for exercising power (cooperation/conflict), and historical control (low/high). The independent variables are LTA traits of Israeli leaders regarding the psychological processes of object appraisal (terrorist attacks and fatalities), ego defense (mistrust and self-confidence/), and mediation of self-other relations (task v. process orientation and belief in ability to control events). Our sources are the Global Terrorism Data Base and the Psychological Characteristics of Leaders data set. They are analyzed within the context of game theory models of complex adaptive systems (cas).

1951年，内森·莱茨（Nathan Leites）提出“操作码（Operational Code）”概念时，将其视为国家的社会心理建构。苏联政治局的个体并非基于自身特质行事，而是遵循源自列宁的统一行为模式。
然而，国际关系（International Relations, IR）领域的政治心理学研究大多仅聚焦于个体层面的心理活动，却忽略了社会建构维度。
本文重新回归“国家作为社会实体”的理念——这类实体包含讨论、协商，且身处复杂自适应系统（Complex Adaptive System, CAS）之中，其集体表现即为“国家心理”。
由此衍生出诸多可检验的假说，涉及不同任期内乃至跨任期的国家心理延续性，具体包括：因外部动因（客体评估）产生的学习效应；因内部动因（自我防御）产生的调控效应；以及由学习与调控过程引发的社会互动效应（自我-他者中介）。
我们通过考察三位迥异的以色列领导人——阿里尔·沙龙（Ariel Sharon）、埃胡德·奥尔默特（Ehud Olmert）与本雅明·内塔尼亚胡（Benjamin Netanyahu）——的显性国家心理，对上述假说展开验证。
我们采用基于言语材料的标准远程心理评估方法，并运用该领域两大经典心理建构工具：操作码分析（Operational Code Analysis, OCA，认知维度）与领导特质分析（Leadership Trait Analysis, LTA，人格维度）。
本研究的因变量为以色列领导人在操作码分析框架下的核心信念，包括：对政治宇宙本质的认知（友好/敌对）、行使权力的最优策略（合作/冲突），以及历史掌控感（强/弱）。
自变量则为以色列领导人在领导特质分析框架下的特质维度，涵盖：客体评估相关的心理过程（恐怖袭击与人员伤亡）、自我防御相关的心理过程（不信任与自信），以及自我-他者关系中介过程（任务导向vs.过程导向，以及对掌控事件能力的信念）。
本研究的数据来源为全球恐怖主义数据库（Global Terrorism Database）与领导人心理特征数据集，所有分析均基于复杂自适应系统的博弈论模型展开。