Replication Data for: Prosecuting the Political Opposition: The Court and Subnational Variation in the Onset of the Maoist Conflict in Nepal

Courts and judicial institutions are often overlooked in armed conflict research. Before the rebel group is formed and initiates armed confrontation, states and their allies — directly and indirectly — mobilize the court to prosecute selected individuals to deter political opposition and establish state legitimacy. This article argues that the state can directly prosecute potential political challengers through criminal cases, deterring aspiring political leaders from organizing the rebellion at the local level. Similarly, the state can indirectly use its local collaborators to prosecute potential civilian supporters in the court by filing civil cases, intensifying local discontent, and exacerbating underlying grievances against the state and its local collaborators. The state’s direct and indirect involvement in generating legitimacy affects the subnational risk of conflict onset differently. Analyses of original data for all 75 district-level courts in Nepal between 1991 and 2006 and the onset of the Maoist conflict show robust support for the arguments.

武装冲突研究领域中，法院与司法机构往往遭到忽视。在反叛组织成立并发起武装对抗之前，国家及其盟友会通过直接与间接手段动用司法机构起诉特定个体，以此震慑政治反对势力并确立国家合法性。本文提出，国家可通过刑事案件直接起诉潜在政治挑战者，震慑野心勃勃的政治领袖在地方层面发起叛乱。同理，国家可间接借助其地方合作者，通过提起民事诉讼在法庭上起诉潜在平民支持者，进而加剧当地不满情绪，激化民众对国家及其地方合作者的积怨。国家在合法性构建中的直接与间接参与，对冲突爆发的次国家级风险存在差异化影响。针对尼泊尔1991年至2006年间全部75个地区级法院的原始数据，以及毛派冲突的爆发情况展开的实证分析，为本文论点提供了稳健的实证支持。